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PROTECTING THE ERISA WHISTLEBLOWER:  
THE REACH OF SECTION 510 OF ERISA 
Adam B. Gartner*
 
 
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) to ensure the protection of private employee benefits.  In doing so, 
Congress created uniform national standards for the administration of 
private employee benefit plans.  Section 510 of ERISA affords some 
protection to whistleblowers who report ERISA violations.  There is 
uncertainty, however, about whether section 510 protects a whistleblower 
who complains directly to his or her employer, or whether protection is 
limited to an individual who makes a report externally.  Some circuit courts 
have held that section 510 protects all ERISA whistleblowers, while others 
have held that section 510’s protections are more limited.  This Note 
considers the history of ERISA and of whistleblower laws, addresses the 
circuit split over the reach of section 510’s whistleblower protection 
provisions, and proposes an interpretation of section 510 that would 
provide broad protection to ERISA whistleblowers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Leslie Boran was the controller of the Royal Poinciana Golf Club in 
Naples, Florida.1  In early 2010, she alerted the Club’s board of trustees that 
they were violating the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA).2  She demanded that they correct the violations and report them 
to the government.3  Specifically, Boran told the trustees that the 
company’s 401(k) plan was wrongfully charging employees an 
administrative fee and that the Club was wrongfully failing to consider 
holiday bonuses as income to be matched under the 401(k) plan.4  In March 
2010, Boran returned from vacation to present the annual financial report at 
the Club’s board meeting.5  Before she had a chance to present the report, 
Boran was arrested for trespassing and thrown in jail.6  The Club had fired 
Boran while she was on vacation and barred her from the premises.7
 
 1. Aisling Swift, Naples CPA Contends Blowing Whistle Got Her Fired, NAPLES DAILY 
NEWS, Mar. 21, 2010, http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2010/mar/21/naples-cpa-contends-
blowing-whistle-got-her-fired. 
  Boran 
 2. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 
(2006 & Supp. III 2009) and scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 3. Swift, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  The club claimed that Boran resigned on February 22, 2010, and was not 
actually fired. Id.  Boran disputed this claim. Id. 
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asserted that she was fired because she reported the alleged ERISA 
violations to the trustees.8
Private employee benefit funds, which control trillions of dollars in 
assets,
 
9 have not been immune to corruption.  The Teamsters’ Central 
States Pension Fund is still under federal oversight due to corruption and 
fraud in the 1960s and 1970s.10  More recently, in 2009, a benefits 
administrator for the Sandhogs Union in New York City was charged with 
embezzling $42 million from the Union’s benefit funds over a seven-year 
period.11
What recourse would Boran, or any employee who discovered ongoing 
violations, have if he or she were terminated for internally reporting ERISA 
violations?  The answer is not clear based on the current state of ERISA 
case law. 
 
Passed by Congress in 1974, ERISA drastically altered the relationship 
between the federal government and private employee benefit plans and 
turned the regulation of private employee benefit plans into an exclusively 
federal matter.12  ERISA is also considered one of the most complicated 
and confusing federal statutes to navigate, with many sections still being 
judicially interpreted today.13
Still under consideration is section 510 of ERISA.
 
14  Section 510 protects 
individuals from employer retaliation for certain activities.15  One such 
activity that section 510 protects is whistleblowing.16  A “whistleblower” is 
an individual who seeks to change current practices by revealing 
information about the behavior or practices.17  The protection of 
whistleblowers is considered vital to a “democratic, free enterprise 
system.”18
 
 8. Id. 
  Some whistleblowers have received national attention for their 
acts, such as in 2002, when Time Magazine named “the Whistleblowers” as 
 9. See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ASSETS IN QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS, 1985–
2002:  REVISED, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0904fact.pdf. 
 10. See Mary Williams Walsh, Teamsters Find Pensions at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2004, at A1. 
 11. Russ Buettner, Woman Stole from Union, Charges Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at 
A32. 
 12. See Dennis K. Schaeffer, Comment, Insuring the Protection of ERISA Plan 
Participants:  ERISA Preemption and the Federal Government’s Duty to Regulate Self-
Insured Health Plans, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (1999). 
 13. See, e.g., Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1644 (2010) (noting that the facts 
in most ERISA matters are “exceedingly complicated”); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 
U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (ERISA is an “enormously complex and detailed statute”); Nachman 
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980) (describing ERISA as a 
“comprehensive and reticulated statute”). 
 14. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).  The text of this Note will refer to ERISA provisions by 
the original section number within ERISA, as opposed to the section number in the United 
States Code. 
 15. See id.; see also infra Part I.C (describing the protections that section 510 provides). 
 16. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 17. MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 15 (1992). 
 18. See Winters v. Hous. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 730 (Tex. 1990) 
(Doggett, J., concurring). 
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its Persons of the Year.19  Despite this national admiration for 
whistleblowers, there is still much confusion about whether section 510 
applies to internal complaints made by an employee to an employer, or 
whether it applies only to external complaints made to an outside agency.20
This Note addresses the unresolved circuit split over the reach of 
ERISA’s whistleblower protection provisions.  Part I of this Note provides 
an overview of the history of ERISA and of whistleblower laws generally, 
and explains some of the key provisions of ERISA.  Part II details the 
circuit split over whether section 510 of ERISA applies to internal 
whistleblower complaints.  Part III endorses an interpretation of section 510 
that would provide the greatest level of protection for ERISA 
whistleblowers. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND OF ERISA AND WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 
An appreciation of the basic framework of ERISA and its goals is 
necessary to understand how courts interpret ERISA.  First, this part 
chronicles ERISA’s passage and details key elements of ERISA’s 
regulatory framework, specifically its fiduciary protection policies, its civil 
enforcement regime, and ERISA preemption.  Next, this part provides 
background on whistleblower protection laws, and contrasts state and 
federal whistleblower protection.  Finally, this part gives a detailed 
overview of section 510 of ERISA. 
A.  An Overview of ERISA 
This section first provides a summary of the events leading to ERISA’s 
passage.  Next, it describes the type of employee benefit plans to which 
ERISA applies.  Then, this section explains three important parts of ERISA:  
fiduciary responsibility, civil enforcement, and preemption. 
1.  The Road to ERISA 
The Studebaker Corporation’s closure of its automotive plant in South 
Bend, Indiana in December 1963 was perhaps the major impetus for the 
passage of ERISA.21  When the plant closed, Studebaker’s pension plan 
lacked the funds to pay the workers their full pensions.22  In the years 
following the Studebaker plan’s failure, both Congress and the public 
questioned why the Studebaker plan was underfunded.23
 
 19. See generally Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 
30, 2002–Jan. 6, 2003, at 30. 
  Some 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974:  
A POLITICAL HISTORY 51 (2004); Kermit J. Berylson, ERISA Revolutionizes the Pension 
Field, CPA J., Apr. 1977, at 23, 23; Philip Shabecoff, Washington and Business:  ERISA—
Still 5-Letter Word for Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1977, at D1. 
 22. WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 51; Landon Wade Magnusson, Note, Golden Gate and 
the Ninth Circuit’s Threat to ERISA’s Uniformity and Jurisprudence, 2010 BYU L. REV. 
167, 168. 
 23. WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 51. 
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commentators claimed that company officials misused the pension plan’s 
funds,24 while others, such as Congressman John Dent of Pennsylvania, 
claimed that the “company had redirected its pension funds toward new 
acquisitions.”25  In actuality, the plan failed because of its funding structure, 
as opposed to any nefarious scheme.26  Studebaker and the United Auto 
Workers had agreed to a pension plan funding formula that exposed 
younger employees to greater risk that the pension plan would default.27  
Whatever the reason behind the Studebaker plan’s failure, the reality was 
that the workers lost their pensions.28
Congress kept the Studebaker plan’s failure in mind over the ensuing 
decade as it proceeded to draft ERISA.
 
29  After years of debate in Congress, 
on September 2, 1974—Labor Day—President Gerald Ford signed ERISA 
into law.30  Prior to ERISA, the determination of the amount of risk in 
private pension plans was typically left to the contracting parties.31  ERISA 
completely changed this by making it federal policy to provide security for 
private pension plans.32
ERISA’s main goals were promoting proper management of benefit fund 
finances, preventing mismanagement and abuse, protecting participants’ 
pensions, preserving substantial employer control over plan sponsorship, 
and creating uniform national standards for the governance of private 
pension plans.
 
33  While ERISA did not require private companies to 
provide benefits, it did create a framework to help provide protection to 
private benefit plan participants.34
2.  What ERISA Covers 
 
ERISA applies to pension benefit plans and welfare benefit plans.35  
Pension benefit plans are plans that defer income until retirement or 
termination of employment, or provide retirement income to participants.36
 
 24. Id. 
  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 51–52. 
 27. Id. at 52–53. 
 28. See id. at 51–53. 
 29. See, e.g., Robert E. Dallos, Pension Funds:  Congress to Study Tighter Regulations, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1966, at 63; Michael C. Jensen, Pension Revisions Expected in 1972, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1971, at 72; Michael C. Jensen, Pensions Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, June 
27, 1971, at F1; David E. Rosenbaum, Pension Reform Measure Voted by House, 375 to 4, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1974, at 1. 
 30. See Bruce F. Spencer, 1966–1975:  The Decade of ERISA, EMP. BENEFIT PLAN REV., 
Mar. 1996, at 54, 54–55. 
 31. WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 3. 
 32. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90–91 (1983); WOOTEN, supra note 
21, at 3. 
 33. See PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA:  PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 14 
(2010); WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 4–5. 
 34. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91. 
 35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006); WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 5. 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A); WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 6. 
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Welfare benefit plans include certain employee health benefit, life 
insurance, and disability insurance plans.37
ERISA does not require employers to provide any specific employee 
benefits; rather, it sets standards that plan sponsors must follow when they 
choose to provide benefits.
 
38  ERISA provides guidelines for, among other 
things, vesting,39 plan funding,40 and fiduciary standards.41
ERISA applies to two main types of pension benefit plans:  defined 
contribution plans and defined benefit plans.
 
42  A defined contribution plan 
is a plan in which the employer and/or participant contributes to an 
individual account on the participant’s behalf.43  The contributions are then 
invested on the participant’s behalf, and the participant eventually receives 
the balance in the account.44  Some examples of defined contribution plans 
are 401(k) plans, 403(b) plans, employee stock ownership plans, and profit-
sharing plans.45  A defined benefit plan is any type of deferred 
compensation program that is not a defined contribution plan.46  With a 
defined benefit plan, a participant is guaranteed certain benefits at 
retirement based on a set formula.47  Factors that can influence the ultimate 
level of benefits include length of service, compensation level, and age.48  
The employer is obligated to pay benefits at the promised level—if the plan 
lacks the funds, the employer must make up the difference.49
ERISA also created the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) 
to insure defined benefit pension plans.
 
50  After the Studebaker failure, 
union leaders pushed for a “pension reinsurance” program to protect 
workers if a fund defaulted on its obligations.51
 
 37. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1); WIEDENBECK, supra note 
  The PBGC is intended to 
ensure that defined benefit pension plans are able to pay out retirement 
33, at 5–6. 
 38. WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 18–19. 
 39. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
 40. See id. §§ 1082–1085 (Supp. III 2009). 
 41. See id. § 1104 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
 42. See id. § 1002(34)–(35) (2006); see also WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7. 
 43. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34); see also WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7; Frequently 
Asked Questions About Pension Plans and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_compliance_pension.html [hereinafter FAQs About 
ERISA] (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). 
 44. WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7; FAQs About ERISA, supra note 43. 
 45. WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7–8; FAQs About ERISA, supra note 43. 
 46. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35); WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7; FAQs About ERISA, supra 
note 43. 
 47. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7; Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined 
Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 455 (2004); FAQs About ERISA, supra note 43. 
 48. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7; Zelinsky, supra note 47, at 456. 
 49. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7; Zelinsky, supra note 47, at 456. 
 50. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., A PREDICTABLE, SECURE PENSION FOR LIFE:  
DEFINED BENEFIT PENSIONS (2000), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/
A_Predictable_Secure_Pension_for_Life.pdf. 
 51. See WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 52; Bernard Shakin, Tough on Fiduciaries, 
BARRON’S NAT’L BUS. & FIN. WKLY., Dec. 16, 1974, at 11; see also supra Part I.A.1 
(discussing the Studebaker failure). 
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benefits when they come due.52  The PBGC monitors the health of defined 
benefit pension funds, and, in the event a plan terminates without sufficient 
funds to pay all benefits, the PBGC pays out pension benefits to 
participants.53  The PBGC only insures defined benefit funds; it does not 
insure defined contribution funds.54  Employers who sponsor defined 
benefit plans pay premiums at a rate set by Congress to fund the PBGC,55 
and the PBGC also maintains a $100 million line of credit with the United 
States Treasury.56  The PBGC does not receive any taxpayer funds, but 
recent concerns over pension plan funding have led to concerns that 
taxpayer support, or a “taxpayer bailout,” may be necessary.57
3.  ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility 
 
This section describes ERISA’s fiduciary conduct standards.  As will be 
discussed in Part II of this Note, ERISA’s fiduciary conduct standards play 
an important role in determining the reach of section 510.58
ERISA requires that benefit plans identify “one or more named 
fiduciaries who . . . shall have authority to control and manage the operation 
and administration of the plan.”
 
59  ERISA defines a fiduciary not just 
formally but also functionally60:  an individual may become a fiduciary by 
being named a fiduciary, or based on functions the individual performs with 
respect to the plan.61  A person who exercises “discretionary control or 
authority over the plan’s management, administration, or assets” becomes a 
fiduciary by virtue of performing those functions.62
 
 52. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006); Michael Barbanell Landres, Note, Smoke, Mirrors, 
and ERISA:  The False Illusion of Retirement Income Security, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1169, 
1182–83 (2007); Major Provisions of the Pension Bill Signed by Ford, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 
1974, at 24. 
 
 53. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302; General FAQs About PBGC, PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 
http://www.pbgc.gov/about/faq/pg/general-faqs-about-pbgc.html (last visited Sept. 21, 
2011). 
 54. See General FAQs About PBGC, supra note 53. 
 55. 29 U.S.C. § 1306 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
 56. Id. § 1305 (2006). 
 57. See, e.g., Javier Hernandez, Bill Would Extend Time to Fund Pension Plans, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2009, at B4; Editorial, The UAW’s Defined Benefactor, WALL ST. J., July 
25–26, 2009, at A12; Alex J. Pollock, The Next Big Bailout?, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2006, 
12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/19/
AR2006041901967.html. 
 58. See infra Part II. 
 59. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).  A “named fiduciary” is either a fiduciary who is named in 
the plan document, or is identified as a fiduciary by the employer organization. Id. 
§ 1102(a)(2). 
 60. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993); see also ERISA 
FIDUCIARY LAW 12–13 (Susan P. Serota & Frederick A. Brodie eds., 2d ed. 2006); 
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 111–13. 
 61. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 12–14; 
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 111–13. 
 62. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 251; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); ERISA FIDUCIARY 
LAW, supra note 60, at 12–13; WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 112. 
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Section 404(a) of ERISA lays out the responsibilities of an ERISA 
fiduciary.63  A fiduciary must act “solely in the interest of the participants 
and beneficiaries” of the plan.64  Inherent in this requirement are the four 
main responsibilities of the fiduciary.65  First, the fiduciary must act “for 
the exclusive purpose” of providing benefits to plan participants and 
beneficiaries and of defraying reasonable expenses in administering the 
plan.66  Second, a fiduciary must act “with the care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting 
in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct 
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”67  Third, the 
fiduciary must ensure that the plan’s assets are sufficiently diversified to 
minimize the risk of loss.68  Fourth, a fiduciary must act in accordance with 
the plan document and other plan governing instruments, as long as they do 
not violate ERISA.69
A fiduciary has the duty to review plan investments and plan actions to 
ensure that they comply with the plan document and with ERISA’s 
regulations.
 
70  Whether or not a fiduciary fulfills this duty is judged based 
upon how someone with expertise in an area would act, and a fiduciary’s 
lack of expertise in an area will not exempt a fiduciary from the 
requirements set forth in section 404(a).71
In certain instances an ERISA fiduciary may have a duty to disclose 
information to plan participants.
 
72  In Varity Corp. v. Howe,73 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that lying to participants is “inconsistent with the duty 
of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries.”74  Additionally, some circuit courts have 
held that a fiduciary has a duty to disclose if a plan is “serious[ly] 
consider[ing]” benefit plan changes that could or might affect participants’ 
retirement decisions.75
 
 63. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). 
  Statutorily, ERISA plan administrators must furnish 
 64. Id. § 1104(a)(1). 
 65. See id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)–(D). 
 66. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 31–32; 
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 120. 
 67. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 32; 
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 120. 
 68. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 32; 
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 120. 
 69. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 33; 
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 120–21. 
 70. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104. 
 71. See, e.g., Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1489–90 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
obtaining an independent appraisal does not satisfy a fiduciary’s duty); Fink v. Nat’l Sav. & 
Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“A fiduciary’s independent investigation of 
the merits of a particular investment is at the heart of the prudent person standard.”); 
Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1474 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that a fiduciary may 
seek advice from experts to fulfill section 404(a)’s prudence standards); see also ERISA 
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 237–38. 
 72. ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 772–73. 
 73. 516 U.S. 489 (1996). 
 74. Id. at 506. 
 75. See Fischer v. Phila. Electric Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1539 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 
Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1997); Hockett v. Sun Co., 109 F.3d 
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to participants and beneficiaries summary plan descriptions, annual reports, 
and similar documents,76 and ERISA fiduciaries may have a duty to correct 
any misstatement in these reports.77
Employee benefit plans may not exempt a fiduciary from the statutorily 
required responsibilities.
 
78  Fiduciaries who fail to fulfill their fiduciary 
responsibilities may be held personally liable under section 409 of ERISA 
for losses that result from the violation.79
Where there are multiple plan fiduciaries, a fiduciary may be held liable 
under section 405 of ERISA for another fiduciary’s breach of duty.
 
80  The 
fiduciary may also be held liable if the fiduciary “participates knowingly in, 
or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or omission of such other 
fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach.”81  Fiduciaries who 
have actual knowledge that they are assisting co-fiduciaries in violating 
ERISA have a duty to stop providing assistance and disclose the 
violations.82
Fiduciaries may also be held liable if they have “knowledge of” a co-
fiduciary’s breach and fail to take reasonable steps to remedy the breach.
 
83  
The level of knowledge necessary to trigger the obligation varies, as some 
courts have held that actual knowledge is necessary to trigger the 
obligation,84 while at least one court has held that constructive knowledge 
is sufficient.85
Finally, fiduciaries can be held liable if their failure to fulfill their 
fiduciary duties under section 404(a) enables co-fiduciaries to breach their 
own fiduciary duties.
 
86
 
1515, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997); cf. Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 189 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 
1999) (holding that “serious consideration” is one of the factors to be considered when 
determining if disclosure is required); Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 122 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (“serious consideration” is not the “talismanic” requirement in determining if 
disclosure is required). 
  In such a case, the fiduciary need have no actual 
 76. See 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (2006); see also Clovis Trevino Bravo, ERISA 
Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure Claims:  Securities Litigation Under the Guise of 
ERISA?, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 497, 513–14 (2009). 
 77. See, e.g., McAuley v. IBM Corp., 165 F.3d 1038, 1046 (6th Cir. 1999); see also 
ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 789–90. 
 78. 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a); see WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 121. 
 79. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 31. 
 80. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a). 
 81. Id. § 1105(a)(1). 
 82. See id.; see also ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 377. 
 83. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(3). 
 84. See, e.g., Silverman v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 98, 103–04 (2d Cir. 
1998) (holding that a fiduciary can be held liable only if he had actual knowledge of a co-
fiduciary’s breach); Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1011 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a 
fiduciary must have actual knowledge of a co-fiduciary’s breach); Donovan v. Cunningham, 
716 F.2d 1455, 1475 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that section 405 “does not impose vicarious 
liability” and instead requires actual knowledge by the fiduciary). 
 85. See, e.g., In re Dynegy, Inc. ERISA Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 861, 905–06 (S.D. Tex. 
2004); see also ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 378. 
 86. See 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2) (providing that a fiduciary is liable for another 
fiduciary’s breach if the fiduciary’s failure to comply with section 404(a) has “enabled such 
other fiduciary to commit a breach”); see also supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text 
(discussing the ERISA fiduciary responsibility standards). 
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knowledge of the co-fiduciary’s breach; it is sufficient that the co-fiduciary 
was able to commit the ERISA violation because the fiduciary failed to 
follow section 404(a).87
4.  Civil Enforcement of ERISA 
 
Section 502(a) of ERISA88 provides the primary means of civil 
enforcement of ERISA.  This section discusses the three main options that 
section 502(a) provides.89
The first option authorizes a participant or beneficiary to bring an action 
under section 502(a)(1)(B) for “benefits due” under the plan, to enforce 
rights under the plan, or to clarify an individual’s rights to future benefits 
under the plan.
 
90  This option is the “workhorse of ERISA remedy law” that 
participants routinely use when they believe they have been wrongfully 
denied plan benefits.91
The second option authorizes the Secretary of Labor, a participant, a 
beneficiary, or a fiduciary to bring an action under section 502(a)(2) against 
a fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty as set forth in section 409 of 
ERISA.
 
92  In the case of a defined benefit plan, recovery under section 
502(a)(2) is limited to relief sought on behalf of the plan, as opposed to 
relief on behalf of the individual.93  In the case of a defined contribution 
plan, such as a 401(k) plan, individual recovery is permitted where a 
fiduciary’s breach impairs the assets in the individual’s account.94
The third option for bringing a civil action is found in section 502(a)(3), 
which permits a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to bring an action to 
“enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter 
or the terms of the plan” or to “obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) 
to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter 
or the terms of the plan.”
 
95
 
 87. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 581 
(S.D. Tex. 2003); see also ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 
  This option has been viewed as a “catchall” 
60, at 378. 
 88. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
 89. Section 502(a) contains ten subsections detailing who can bring a civil action and 
under what circumstances a civil action may be brought. See id.  This Note will focus only 
on the three primary means available to participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries. See id. 
§ 1132(a)(1)–(3). 
 90. See id. § 1132(a)(1)(B); see also JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA 
LITIGATION 107 (3d ed. 2008). 
 91. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”:  The Supreme Court’s 
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1334 (2003); 
see also Regina L. Readling, Comment, Rethinking “The Plan”:  Why ERISA Section 
502(a)(2) Should Allow Recovery to Individual Defined Contribution Pension Plan 
Accounts, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 315, 329 (2008). 
 92. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); see also supra note 79 and accompanying text 
(describing fiduciary liability under section 409 of ERISA). 
 93. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985); Susan Harthill, A 
Square Peg in a Round Hole:  Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-Whole” Relief Is 
Available Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 61 OKLA. L. REV. 721, 738 (2008). 
 94. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg, & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008); see also 
ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 108–09. 
 95. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 
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provision, providing protection in instances not covered by sections 
502(a)(1) or (2).96  The Supreme Court, in a series of cases, determined that 
“appropriate equitable relief” available under section 502(a)(3) is limited to 
the type of relief “typically available” in courts of equity.97
Courts generally treat the list of plaintiffs provided in section 502(a) as 
exhaustive.
 
98  Thus, an individual or entity not specifically included within 
section 502(a) may not bring a civil action for violations of ERISA.99
5.  ERISA Preemption 
 
Section 514 of ERISA100 provides that ERISA preempts state laws, and 
provides that ERISA “shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any” benefit plan covered by ERISA.101  
Congress included preemption to make regulation of benefit funds 
“exclusively a federal concern,”102 and to ensure that ERISA plans do not 
have to deal with “conflicting or inconsistent” state laws.103  Congressman 
John Dent, one of ERISA’s architects, called section 514 ERISA’s 
“crowning achievement.”104  Courts have struggled to determine when 
ERISA preempts a state law, however.105
In early section 514 preemption cases, the Supreme Court broadly 
interpreted the doctrine of ERISA preemption.
 
106  The Court held that a 
state law “relates to” an ERISA plan if it makes “reference to” or has a 
“connection with” an ERISA plan.107
 
 96. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996); ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra 
note 
  Thus, the Court found that ERISA 
preempts state laws that specifically referenced plans governed by 
90, at 110; Langbein, supra note 91, at 1335. 
 97. See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361–62 (2006); Great-
West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002); Mertens v. Hewitt 
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993); see also Langbein, supra note 91, at 1350. 
 98. See, e.g., Leuthner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ne. Pa., 454 F.3d 120, 125 (3d 
Cir. 2006); Felix v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1160 n.14 (10th Cir. 2004); see also 
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 157; ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 218–19. 
 99. WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 157; ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90,               
at 218–19. 
 100. 29 U.S.C. § 1144. 
 101. Id. § 1144(a).  “‘State law’ includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other 
State action having the effect of law . . . .” Id. § 1144(c)(1).  Preemption does not apply to 
any state law that regulates “insurance, banking, or securities.” Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
 102. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981). 
 103. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr.). 
 104. Id. at 29,197 (statement of Rep. John H. Dent). 
 105. At least one judge has likened the task of understanding ERISA preemption to a 
“descent into a Serbonian bog.” DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring). 
 106. See ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 122; Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No 
Remedy:  Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 137 (2009); 
Elizabeth Barnidge, Comment, What Lies Ahead for ERISA’s Preemption Doctrine After a 
Judicial Call to Action Is Issued in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 125, 135 
(2006). 
 107. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983). 
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ERISA,108 and preempts state law even if the law is consistent with 
ERISA’s purpose.109  Additionally, the Court held that ERISA preempted a 
state law claim where the plaintiff’s claim relies on the existence of, and 
participation in, an ERISA plan.110
In recent years, the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of section 514 
ERISA preemption.
 
111  The change began in New York State Conference of 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,112 where the 
Court shifted from the earlier broad view to one based “on the ‘assumption 
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by 
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.’”113  In Travelers, the Court discussed the policy reasons behind 
preemption—to allow for national uniformity of administration of 
employee benefit plans—and determined that the state law at issue was not 
preempted because it did not interfere with this purpose.114  In cases after 
Travelers, the Court continued to determine whether ERISA preempts a 
state law by considering whether the state law undermines ERISA’s policy 
objectives.115
Because preemption is a defense, and federal court subject matter 
jurisdiction is based on the well-pleaded complaint rule, ERISA section 
514’s preemption of a state law does not automatically confer federal court 
subject matter jurisdiction over the causes of action.
 
116
 
 108. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988) 
(holding that a Georgia state law that specifically made reference to an ERISA plan was 
preempted by ERISA). 
  Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court has determined that Congress’s goal of “creating a 
comprehensive statute for the regulation of employee benefit plans” would 
be “completely undermined” if participants and beneficiaries could obtain 
 109. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 739. 
 110. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139–40 (1990) (holding that 
ERISA preempted a state law wrongful discharge claim where the reason for the discharge 
was to avoid making contributions to the pension fund). 
 111. ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 122; Secunda, supra note 106, at 139–41; 
Barnidge, supra note 106, at 135. 
 112. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
 113. Id. at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see 
also ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 132. 
 114. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657–58. 
 115. See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 843–44 (1997) (holding that a state law was 
preempted because it undermined ERISA by changing ERISA’s “structure and balance”); 
De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 816 (1997) (holding 
that ERISA did not preempt a state tax on hospitals even though hospitals owned or operated 
by ERISA plans would need to pay the tax); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324–25 (1997) (holding that ERISA did not 
preempt a state law regulating apprenticeship programs because the state law did not apply 
specifically to ERISA plans); see also ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 132–36; 
Secunda, supra note 106, at 139–41. 
 116. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207–08 (2004); Metro. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63–65 (1987); see also Robert A. Cohen, Note, Understanding 
Preemption Removal Under ERISA § 502, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 578, 596–97 (1997). 
2011] PROTECTING THE ERISA WHISTLEBLOWER 247 
remedies under state law that ERISA section 502(a) does not provide.117  
Thus, any state law cause of action that “duplicates, supplements, or 
supplants” the remedies that section 502(a) provides is considered a federal 
claim and is completely preempted by ERISA.118
B.  An Overview of Whistleblower Laws 
 
This section provides a general overview of whistleblower protection 
laws.  This section first describes the creation of the modern form of 
whistleblower protection.  Next, it explains the relationship between federal 
and state whistleblower protection, as well as differences between various 
state whistleblower protection laws.  Finally, it compares the different 
methods whistleblowers can use to seek redress for violations. 
1.  The Creation of Whistleblower Laws 
Up until the 1960s, employees were not provided any protection from 
termination for exposing their employers’ improper practices.119  This was 
justified by a strong belief in the doctrine of at-will employment.120  Horace 
Gray Wood is credited with creating this doctrine in 1877.121  Under the at-
will employment doctrine, all hiring is presumed to be “at-will” and can be 
terminated at any time by either party.122  This doctrine was based on the 
premise that employers needed flexibility in hiring, and that employees 
should be free to choose employment as they wished.123  Various courts 
throughout the country adopted the rule after Wood espoused it in 1877.124
The at-will employment doctrine came under attack in the middle part of 
the twentieth century over concerns that employers were taking advantage 
of employees.
 
125
 
 117. See Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 208–09; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 
41, 54 (1987); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985); see also supra 
Part I.A.4 (describing remedies available under section 502(a)). 
  At the same time, the importance of whistleblowers 
 118. See Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 209; Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66. 
 119. See Lois A. Lofgren, Comment, Whistleblower Protection:  Should Legislatures and 
the Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the 
Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316, 318 (1993). 
 120. See STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 22 
(2001); DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING:  THE LAW OF 
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 4–5 (2d ed. 2004). 
 121. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 21; Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the 
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 126 (1976). 
 122. See H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272–73 
(Albany, John D. Parsons, Jr. 1877). 
 123. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 5; Richard A. Lord, The At-Will 
Relationship in the 21st Century:  A Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 
707, 719 (2006). 
 124. Feinman, supra note 121, at 126; Bruce D. Berns, Note, Employers Beware:  The 
Implied Contract Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 28 B.C. L. REV. 327, 331 
n.44 (1987). 
 125. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 22. See generally Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at 
Will vs. Individual Freedom:  On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 
COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967). 
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became increasingly recognized.126  In 1959, California became the first 
state to create an exception to the at-will employment doctrine for 
whistleblowers.127  The California District Court of Appeal held that public 
policy dictated that an employer should not be permitted to discharge an 
employee for truthfully disclosing information to a legislative body, rather 
than lying to the body.128  Today, most states recognize some form of 
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine when an 
employer terminates an employee for an activity, such as whistleblowing, 
that “public policy would encourage,”129 and many states have also enacted 
statutes to protect whistleblowers.130
2.  Different Types of Whistleblower Laws 
 
Most statutes that protect whistleblowers do not specifically refer to or 
define the term “whistleblower.”131  Instead, the statutes describe specific 
conduct for which retaliation is prohibited.132  To determine whether 
specific whistleblowing activity is protected, it is first necessary to 
determine whether the employee is a public sector or private sector 
employee.133
The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA)
 
134 protects federal 
public sector employees who engage in whistleblowing activities.135  
Congress passed the WPA in response to federal employees’ concerns that 
whistleblower complaints were not being investigated promptly, and that 
employees’ identities were being disclosed during the process.136  The 
WPA sets deadlines for investigating whistleblower complaints and 
prohibits disclosure of employees’ identities.137
Nearly all states provide some form of statutory protection for 
whistleblowers.
 
138  The statutes differ on the extent of protection provided.  
Some states protect all public sector employees,139
 
 126. See KOHN, supra note 
 while other states 
protect only employees who perform specific types of work or who work at 
120, at 22. 
 127. See Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1959); KOHN, supra note 120, at 22–23. 
 128. See Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27. 
 129. KOHN, supra note 120, at 23. 
 130. Id. at 23–24; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 10–11. 
 131. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 22. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 1–2. 
 134. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 135. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 99–104; see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 
120, at 62. 
 136. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 62. 
 137. See 5 U.S.C. § 1213 (2006); see also KOHN, supra note 120, at 100–02; WESTMAN & 
MODESITT, supra note 120, at 62–63. 
 138. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 23; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 67, 78; 
see also State Whistleblower Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13390 (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). 
 139. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.100 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1702–1703 
(2005); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 67. 
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specific levels of government.140  Some states also provide statutory 
protection to private sector employees.141  Just as with public sector 
statutes, these private sector protection statutes vary in the scope of 
protection, with some providing protection to all private sector 
employees,142 and others only providing protection to employees who 
engage in specific types of whistleblowing activities.143  State courts have 
also created common law exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine 
that protect specific types of whistleblowing activities.144
Unlike the WPA, which covers all federal sector employees, there is no 
single federal statute that protects all private sector whistleblowers.
 
145  
Instead, Congress included language in various statutes to protect specific 
private sector whistleblower activity.146  Each statute provides varying 
levels of protection and each works in a different way.147  For example, 
employees are protected from employer retaliation if they report to the 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration regarding workplace safety 
issues that present imminent danger or physical harm.148  Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from terminating an 
employee who opposes an employer’s discriminatory practices.149  When 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, it not only prohibited 
retaliation against Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers, but also made employer 
retaliation a criminal offense punishable by up to ten years in prison.150
 
 140. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-2703 (2008) (not protecting certain individuals and 
entities); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-11-102 (2011) (protecting state employees who work more 
than twenty hours per week); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 
  In 
the recently passed Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Congress provided incentives for individuals who come 
forward with “original” information to the Securities and Exchange 
120, at 67. 
 141. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 77–79. 
 142. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 2011) (protecting any employee 
who reports a violation of law to a public body); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 832–833 
(2007); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 77–79. 
 143. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.089 (protecting individuals who report a violation 
of a safety or health standard); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-15-510 (1986) (protecting employees 
who report health and safety violations); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 
77–79. 
 144. See, e.g., Brigham v. Dillon Cos., 935 P.2d 1054, 1060 (Kan. 1997) (recognizing a 
public policy exception for wrongful demotion); Trosper v. Bag ‘N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704, 
707 (Neb. 2007) (recognizing a public policy exception when an employee is terminated for 
filing a workers’ compensation claim); Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 
27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 95–96. 
 145. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 79–80; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120,         
at 77–78. 
 146. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 80; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 78. 
 147. KOHN, supra note 120, at 80; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 88–92. 
 148. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(f), 660(c) (2006); KOHN, supra note 120, at 94–95; WESTMAN 
& MODESITT, supra note 120, at 90. 
 149. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); KOHN, supra note 120, at 83–86. 
 150. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1107, 116 Stat. 745, 810 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1513(e) (Supp. III 2009)) (allowing for a maximum of ten years in prison for 
retaliating against a whistleblower); see also STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER 
LAW:  A GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES 157–58 (2004). 
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Commission.151  These individuals are rewarded with a percentage of the 
monetary sanctions resulting from the information they provided.152
3.  Reporting a Violation:  Internal vs. External Whistleblower Complaints 
 
This section explains the different types of reporting mechanisms in 
whistleblower protection acts, and discusses the different views that exist 
over whether particular whistleblower activities deserve protection.  This 
section specifically focuses on two types of whistleblower activities.  The 
first is “internal” whistleblowing, where all the employee’s actions take 
place within the organization,153 and the second is “external” 
whistleblowing, where the employee makes a complaint outside of the 
organization.154
Internal whistleblowing is sometimes the best way for an employee to 
report problems within an organization.
 
155  While an external disclosure can 
harm the company’s reputation, cause the company to incur legal costs, and 
cause a drop in the company’s stock price,156 an internal complaint 
typically gives the employer the opportunity to rectify any problems 
without negative publicity and without absorbing heavy costs associated 
with a public disclosure.157  Employers can also deal with internal 
complaints more quickly than complaints outside the organization.158  An 
internal complaint may result in less hardship for both the employee and the 
employer.159  Furthermore, most employees prefer to report the situation 
internally.160
If an employee’s internal report fails to convince the employer to fix any 
problems, the employee may report the problem to an outside body or 
 
 
 151. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-6). 
 152. See id. 
 153. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 23.  This Note will discuss the conflict 
over whether section 510 of ERISA protects internal whistleblower complaints in greater 
detail in Part II. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Melissa S. Baucus, Internal vs. External 
Whistleblowers:  A Comparison of Whistleblowering Processes, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 1281, 
1297 (1998); Kevin Rubinstein, Note, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 
806:  Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 641–
42 (2007/08). 
 156. See Robert M. Bowen et al., Whistle-Blowing:  Target Firm Characteristics and 
Economic Consequences, 85 ACCT. REV. 1239, 1253–55 (2010). 
 157. Marcia P. Miceli et al., A Word to the Wise:  How Managers and Policy Makers Can 
Encourage Employees to Report Wrongdoing, 86 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 380 (2009); 
Rubinstein, supra note 155, at 641–42. 
 158. See Lilanthi Ravishankar, Encouraging Internal Whistleblowing in Organizations, 
SANTA CLARA U. (2003), http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/submitted/ 
whistleblowing.html. 
 159. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing:  
Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 
267, 300 (1991); Ravishankar, supra note 158. 
 160. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 17, at 61; Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 159, at 
299–301. 
2011] PROTECTING THE ERISA WHISTLEBLOWER 251 
regulatory agency.161  Employees who make complaints run the risk that 
the employer may terminate them for making the complaint.162  Because 
whistleblower protection does not always extend to internal whistleblowing, 
an employee so terminated may have no remedy.163
Commentators offer several rationales as to why no protection should be 
offered to internal whistleblowers.  One view is that because internal 
whistleblowing is “non-adversarial,” it does not pose a threat to the 
employer.
 
164  Thus, an employer is unlikely to retaliate against the 
employee.165  It is therefore unnecessary to provide protection to such 
employees.166  Yet another concern is that an employee might fabricate an 
internal complaint to justify a retaliation claim.167  This risk is lessened if 
the employee is required to report formally to an administrative body.168  A 
further concern is the difficulty of proving that an employee was discharged 
in retaliation for the complaint.169  For example, an employer may claim 
that it did not terminate the employee because of the internal disclosure, but 
because of an internal management dispute.170
An additional rationale for not protecting internal whistleblowers lies in 
the history of whistleblower law itself.
 
171  Courts originally created a public 
policy exception to the doctrine of at-will employment to provide 
whistleblower protection to employees.172  Unlike external disclosures, 
internal disclosures do not bring public attention to any violations.173  Some 
commentators assert that internal complaints are not deserving of protection 
because without public knowledge, the public does not benefit.174
 
 161. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 
  This 
logic also helps to explain why some states’ whistleblower protection 
17, at 61; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, 
at 48–49. 
 162. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 24. 
 163. See Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of 
Overlapping Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 443, 446 (2009); see also infra Part II. 
 164. See Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 297 (2009). 
 165. See id. at 298. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Cf. id. (“Limiting protection to external whistleblowers means that there will 
ordinarily be an objective record of a report to an independent authority.”). 
 169. See Sarah M. Baum, Note, Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehabilitation Center:  
The Illinois Whistleblower Act Does Not Preempt the Common Law Tort of Retaliatory 
Discharge, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 161, 188 (2007). 
 170. See id. 
 171. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining creation of whistleblower laws). 
 172. See Alex B. Long, Viva State Employment Law!  State Law Retaliation Claims in a 
Post-Crawford/Burlington Northern World, 77 TENN. L. REV. 253, 292–93 (2010); Joseph C. 
Telezinski, Jr., Comment, Without Warning—The Dangers of Protecting “Whistleblowers” 
Who Don’t Blow the Whistle, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 417–18 (2000); see also supra Part 
I.B.1. 
 173. See Long, supra note 172, at 293; Telezinski, supra note 172, at 418. 
 174. See Long, supra note 172, at 293; Telezinski, supra note 172, at 418. 
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statutes protect only employees who report violations that impact public 
health or public safety.175
The public has held whistleblowers out as heroes for their work on 
numerous occasions.
 
176  Whistleblowers often place their livelihoods at 
great risk when they report, however.177  A whistleblower who does not 
come forward in the manner prescribed by the statute risks forfeiting the 
statutory whistleblower protection.178  Thus, whistleblowers should know 
exactly what type of whistleblowing activity is protected before they make 
a disclosure.179
In states that provide protection to private sector whistleblowers, there is 
no uniform rule regarding the type of complaint that triggers legal 
protection.
   
180  Some states only protect external disclosures,181 some 
protect internal and external disclosures,182 and some protect external 
disclosures only if the employee first attempts an internal disclosure.183
C.  An Overview of Section 510 of ERISA 
 
This section reviews the background of section 510 of ERISA and the 
protections that the statute provides to plan participants, beneficiaries, and 
fiduciaries. 
Congress included section 510 in the original act passed in 1974184
 
 175. See Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party 
Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1970 (1996); see also supra notes 
 in 
response to concerns that employers might try to prevent an employee from 
138–43 and accompanying 
text. 
 176. See, e.g., Robert Trigaux, Top 10 Reasons Why Whistle-Blowers Are Heroes, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, http://www.sptimes.com/2002/02/15/Columns/ 
Top_10_reasons_why_wh.shtml; Time Names Whistleblowers as Persons of Year, 
CNN.COM (Dec. 23, 2002), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-12-23/us/time.persons.of.year
_1_icy-river-whistleblowers-accounting-irregularities?_s=PM:US (noting that six out of ten 
Americans view whistleblowers as heroes). 
 177. Lobel, supra note 163, at 486–87; see KOHN, supra note 120, at 21–23. 
 178. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 48–51. 
 179. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 1–3; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120,             
at 41–42. 
 180. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 82–84. 
 181. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 174/15 (West 2010) (only protecting 
individuals who provide information externally); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.362 (West 
2004) (only protecting employees who make an external report); see also WESTMAN & 
MODESITT, supra note 120, at 83. 
 182. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1703 (2005) (protecting internal and external 
disclosures); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-62 (West 2008) (protecting a whistleblower who 
reports to an employer or to a public body); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, 
at 83. 
 183. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102 (West 2002) (protecting an employee who 
discloses or “threaten[s] to disclose” information to an outside body so long as the employee 
first gives the supervisor an opportunity to correct the activity); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 
(McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2011) (requiring that the employee first notify a supervisor of a 
violation before making an external disclosure); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52 
(LexisNexis 2007) (requiring that an employee report to a supervisor before making an 
external disclosure); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 83. 
 184. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 510, 
88 Stat. 829, 895 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §1140 (2006)). 
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attaining benefits.185  Senator Jacob K. Javits, one of the main sponsors of 
ERISA, described section 510 as providing “a remedy for any person fired 
such as is provided for a person discriminated against because of race or 
sex.”186  The House and Senate Reports on ERISA both state that Congress 
intended that section 510 provide “broad remedies for redressing or 
preventing violations” of ERISA.187
Section 510 of ERISA can be broken down into three main parts.
 
188  The 
first part makes it unlawful for any person to “discharge, fine, suspend, 
expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary” for 
exercising any right to which the participant or beneficiary is entitled under 
ERISA (the Exercise Clause).189  The Exercise Clause is designed to 
prevent an employer from terminating an employee because the employee 
filed a claim for benefits, or brought litigation challenging a denial of 
benefits.190
The second part of section 510 makes it unlawful for a person to 
“interfer[e] with the attainment” of any right to which the participant “may 
become entitled” (the Interference Clause).
 
191  Because Congress was 
concerned that employers would fire employees just before they would vest 
in a pension plan,192 section 510 prohibits such activity.193  Congress 
included the Interference Clause to prevent an “unscrupulous employer[]” 
from discharging an employee to prevent the employee from obtaining 
vested benefits.194  Because welfare benefits, in contrast to pension 
benefits, do not vest,195 there was initially a question of whether section 
510 applied to welfare plans.196
 
 185. See 119 CONG. REC. 30,043–44 (1973). 
  The Supreme Court settled this question 
 186. Id. at 30,044. 
 187. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655; 
S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871. 
 188. In 2006, Congress amended section 510 to protect a “contributing employer” who 
exercises rights under ERISA or who gives information or testifies in any “inquiry or 
proceeding” relating to ERISA. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, § 205, 
120 Stat. 780, 889 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1140).  This Note will not discuss this additional 
protection. 
 189. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 190. See Kowalski v. L & F Prods., 82 F.3d 1283, 1285 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 
ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 922. 
 191. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 192. An employee who vests in a pension fund has a “non-forfeitable right to benefits 
funded by employer contributions.” FAQs About ERISA, supra note 43; see 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1053 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
 193. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990); WIEDENBECK, 
supra note 33, at 173. 
 194. See West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980); see also S. REP. NO. 93-127, 
at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871; ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 
90, at 922. 
 195. See 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (2006) (exempting welfare plans from ERISA’s vesting 
requirements). 
 196. Compare Shahid v. Ford Motor Co., 76 F.3d 1404, 1411 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that 
section 510 is not limited to “benefits that will become vested”), and Heath v. Varity Corp., 
71 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that section 510 applies to both rights that are and 
are not capable of vesting), with Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa 
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by holding that section 510 protects welfare plan benefits.197  Some courts 
have also held that section 510 protects participants where the employer’s 
action prevents them from obtaining increased benefits.198
The third part of section 510—and the part most relevant to this Note—
makes it “unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or 
discriminate against any person because he has given information or has 
testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating” to 
ERISA.
 
199  For a claim based on section 510, an employee must 
demonstrate that the employer discharged the employee with the specific 
intent to interfere with the employee’s attainment of benefits.200  Courts 
have determined that this provision bars an employer from terminating an 
individual who testified about an ERISA-related matter in court or before 
an administrative agency.201  The question, however, is whether section 510 
also applies when an employer terminates an individual for reporting 
ERISA violations internally.202
Despite Congress’s intention to establish “broad remedies” under section 
510,
  This conflict will be discussed further in 
Part II of this Note.  
203 there are several noticeable limits to its application.  Section 510 is 
enforced through the civil enforcement framework laid out in section 
502.204  Accordingly, the only individuals permitted to bring actions for 
violations of section 510 are those listed in section 502,205 and the only 
remedies available are those provided in section 502.206
Section 510 may preempt state law wrongful discharge claims.
 
207  
Several circuits have held that ERISA can preempt state law even if ERISA 
does not provide the remedy that the plaintiff seeks.208
 
Fe Ry. Co., 80 F.3d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that section 510 only applies to rights 
that are capable of vesting), vacated, 520 U.S. 510 (1997). 
  Thus, an employee 
 197. See Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 
U.S. 510, 512 (1997). 
 198. See, e.g., Godfrey v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 89 F.3d 755, 759 (11th Cir. 1996); 
Heath, 71 F.3d at 258; Conkwright v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 237 (4th 
Cir. 1991). 
 199. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 200. See, e.g., Bodine v. Emp’rs Cas. Co., 352 F.3d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 2003); Salus v. 
GTE Directories Serv. Corp., 104 F.3d 131, 135 (7th Cir. 1997); Barbour v. Dynamics 
Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 201. See King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003); cf. Edwards v. 
A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 
(2011). 
 202. See infra Part II. 
 203. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text. 
 204. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) (“The provisions of [29 U.S.C. § 1132] shall be 
applicable in the enforcement of this section.”); see also supra Part I.A.4 (describing 
ERISA’s civil enforcement framework). 
 205. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra Part I.A.5. 
 208. The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that ERISA preempts state law even if 
the particular remedy sought is unavailable under ERISA. See, e.g., Anderson v. Elec. Data 
Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 
412 (9th Cir. 1993); Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1985). 
2011] PROTECTING THE ERISA WHISTLEBLOWER 255 
making a whistleblower complaint under the assumption that state law 
protects the activity and provides an appropriate remedy may discover that 
state law does not apply and that federal law does not provide the remedy 
sought by the plaintiff.209
II.  PROTECTION OF INTERNAL COMPLAINTS:  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
Part II of this Note details the conflict between U.S. Courts of Appeals 
over whether section 510 protects individuals who make internal complaints 
about ERISA violations.  While section 510 is clearly understood to protect 
an employee who testifies before a court or gives information to a 
regulatory body such as the Department of Labor,210
A.  Unsolicited Internal Complaints Are Protected 
 it is less clear what 
protection section 510 affords an employee who notifies an employer of 
ERISA violations taking place within the company.  First, this part details 
the view of the Ninth and Fifth Circuits that section 510 protects unsolicited 
internal complaints.  Part II.B analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s view that 
section 510 protects only formal external complaints.  Part II.C discusses 
the Second Circuit’s position that internal complaints are protected as long 
as they are part of an “inquiry or proceeding.”  Part II.D details the view of 
the Third Circuit that section 510 does not protect unsolicited internal 
complaints. 
1.  The Ninth Circuit 
In Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii,211 the Ninth Circuit held that section 
510 of ERISA protects employees who make unsolicited internal 
complaints to employers about ERISA violations.212  Plaintiff Jessica 
Hashimoto brought a lawsuit in Hawaii state court alleging that her 
employer, the Bank of Hawaii, terminated her for complaining to her 
supervisors about various ERISA violations.213  This, she asserted, violated 
Hawaii’s Whistleblowers Protection Act.214  Hashimoto alleged that 
Donald Feekin, an employee of the bank, improperly ordered her to 
reimburse a former employee from a profit-sharing plan for taxes that had 
been properly withheld from distribution.215
 
 209. See David Angueira & David Conforto, Without a Remedy:  The Massachusetts 
Whistleblower’s Brush with ERISA, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 955, 956 (2006); Jessica 
Barclay-Strobel, Comment, Shooting the Messenger:  How Enforcement of FLSA and ERISA 
Is Thwarted by Courts’ Interpretations of the Statutes’ Antiretaliation and Remedies 
Provisions, 58 UCLA L. REV. 521, 542 (2010). 
  She further alleged that Judith 
Wetzel, another bank employee, ordered her to improperly “recalculate a 
 210. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 211. 999 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 212. See id. at 411. 
 213. See id. at 409–10. 
 214. See id. at 409. 
 215. See id. at 410. 
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former employee’s pension plan benefit and to use final pay, not final 
average pay.”216
After the bank removed the case to federal court, the district court 
granted summary judgment to the bank on the grounds that ERISA 
preempted Hashimoto’s state law claim.
 
217  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that section 510 provided protection to whistleblowers, and that 
section 502(a) empowered Hashimoto to bring a cause of action for 
relief.218  The court determined ERISA’s preemption of state law was 
“total” because the state law cause of action could be characterized as a 
federal action.219
To reach its determination, the court analyzed the specific language of 
section 510.
 
220  Noting that section 510 protects an individual who gives 
“information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or 
proceeding” relating to ERISA, the court held that the statute was “clearly 
meant to protect whistle blowers.”221  As a result, the statute protects 
employees like Hashimoto who are fired for protesting ERISA 
violations.222
To determine what type of “inquiry or proceeding” the statute protects 
the court analyzed the process that an employee would be likely to take 
when making a whistleblower complaint.
 
223  The court reasoned that an 
employee would normally notify an ERISA plan manager before going to 
an outside agency like the Department of Labor.224  If employers face no 
consequence for discharging employees who initially complain to 
management, the whole process would be cut off at the start.225  Thus, 
allowing “anticipatory discharge discourages the whistle blower before the 
whistle is blown.”226
The court did not, however, reach the question of whether section 510 
protects all employees and former employees who are terminated for 
notifying management about ERISA violations.
 
227  The court held only that 
Hashimoto was entitled to bring an action under section 510 because 
section 502(a) afforded her a cause of action as an ERISA fiduciary.228
In McBride v. PLM International, Inc.,
 
229
 
 216. Id. 
 the Ninth Circuit considered 
whether an employee who was terminated after engaging in whistleblower 
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. at 411–12. 
 219. See id. at 412; see also supra Part I.A.5. 
 220. See Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See id. 
 224. See id. 
 225. See id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. The court noted that it was possible that only individuals whom section 502 
“empower[s] to bring a civil action” may bring an action based on section 510. See id.; see 
also supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 229. 179 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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activity was entitled to bring a cause of action as a participant under 
sections 510 and 502(a).230  The court reaffirmed its holding in Hashimoto 
that section 510 is “clearly meant to protect whistle blowers” and then 
considered whether section 510 applied to a plan participant.231  In 
McBride, the court rejected the defendant’s assertion that McBride was no 
longer a participant because the plan in issue had been terminated by the 
time the plaintiff filed the lawsuit.232  The court held that the status of the 
individual making the complaint should be judged at the time the complaint 
arises, not at the time that litigation commences.233  The court noted that 
the defendant’s interpretation would encourage employers to terminate 
plans to avoid liability for section 510 violations.234  Thus, section 510 
protects participants who engage in whistleblowing activity.235
2.  The Fifth Circuit 
 
The Fifth Circuit was the next circuit to consider section 510’s reach.  In 
Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.,236 the Fifth Circuit determined 
that section 510 protects unsolicited internal complaints.237
Plaintiff George Anderson initially brought state common law claims 
against Electronic Data Systems (EDS) in Texas state court asserting, 
among other claims, wrongful discharge.
 
238  Anderson alleged that another 
employee at EDS had asked him to approve payment invoices for funds 
retained by another employee without approval of the pension fund’s board 
of trustees, and to write up minutes for meetings that he did not attend, both 
violations of ERISA.239  Anderson claimed that EDS terminated him after 
he refused to commit the acts and reported the other employee’s conduct to 
management.240  EDS removed the case to federal district court, which 
granted summary judgment to EDS on the wrongful discharge claim.241  
Anderson appealed, claiming that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction and seeking a remand to state court on the wrongful discharge 
claim.242
The Fifth Circuit, noting that Anderson had never asserted a federal cause 
of action, analyzed whether ERISA preemption allowed for removal to 
 
 
 230. Id. at 740–41. 
 231. Id. at 742. 
 232. See id. at 743–44. 
 233. See id. at 743. 
 234. See id. at 746. 
 235. See id. at 743. 
 236. 11 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 237. See id. at 1314. 
 238. See id. at 1312. 
 239. See id. at 1312–13. 
 240. See id. 
 241. See id. at 1313. 
 242. See id.  Anderson sought to keep the case out of federal court by deleting all 
references to ERISA from his complaint. See id.  The court held that deleting the references 
did not alter the fact that the action depended on the existence of an ERISA plan and was 
thus preempted by ERISA. See id. at 1314; see also supra Part I.A.5 (explaining ERISA 
preemption). 
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federal court.243  The court first considered whether ERISA preempted 
Anderson’s state law claims.244  The court followed the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon.245  In McClendon, the 
Supreme Court had held that ERISA preempted a state law wrongful 
discharge claim because the claim did not just involve an ERISA plan, but 
depended on the “existence” of an ERISA plan,246 and because the state 
claim would conflict with the enforcement provisions provided by ERISA 
sections 502 and 510.247  The Fifth Circuit determined that Anderson’s 
claim depended on the existence of an ERISA plan because it was based on 
his refusal to commit ERISA violations and his reporting the violations to 
management.248  Additionally, Anderson’s claim fell “squarely within the 
ambit” of section 510.249  Thus, the court concluded that ERISA preempts a 
state wrongful discharge claim for “refusal to commit [ERISA violations] 
and for reporting such violations to management.”250
The court next considered whether the federal court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over Anderson’s state law wrongful discharge claim.
 
251  The 
court applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning from Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. v. Taylor.252  In Taylor, the Supreme Court had held that a 
cause of action that falls within the scope of section 502(a) is completely 
preempted by ERISA and subject to removal.253  Section 502 enforces 
section 510, which “broadly prohibits” an employer from terminating 
participants and beneficiaries for giving information or testimony relating to 
ERISA.254  Thus, the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction because 
Anderson’s claim fell within the enforcement provisions provided by 
section 502(a).255
The court noted that the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota 
reached the same conclusion in McLean v. Carlson Cos.
 
256  In McLean, the 
district court determined that a plaintiff who was discharged for making an 
internal complaint had standing to bring an action under section 502(a).257
 
 243. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1313. 
  
The district court reasoned that it made no sense to permit a participant to 
 244. See id. at 1313–14. 
 245. 498 U.S. 133 (1990). 
 246. See id. at 140. 
 247. See id. at 144. 
 248. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314. 
 249. See id. 
 250. See id. 
 251. Id. at 1315.  The court noted that preemption does not end the court’s analysis 
because preemption is a defense and “federal question jurisdiction is determined by the well-
pleaded complaint rule.” Id.; see supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (detailing how 
ERISA completely preempts state law claims where the claim could have been brought 
under section 502(a)). 
 252. 481 U.S. 58 (1987). 
 253. Id. at 66–67. 
 254. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006); supra Part I.C. 
 255. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315. 
 256. 777 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Minn. 1991); see Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315 n.5. 
 257. See McLean, 777 F. Supp. at 1484. 
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seek an injunction under that provision while at the same time denying a 
remedy to a participant who was terminated for complaining internally.258
B.  The Fourth Circuit:  Section 510 Protects Only Formal Complaints 
 
In King v. Marriott International, Inc.,259 the Fourth Circuit held that 
section 510 protects only “formal” disclosures.260  Plaintiff Karen King 
brought a state law wrongful discharge claim asserting that she was 
terminated for complaining about, and refusing to commit, ERISA 
violations.261  King alleged that in late 1998 or early 1999 Karl Fredericks, 
Marriott’s Senior Vice President of Compensation and Benefits, 
recommended that “Marriott transfer millions of dollars from its medical 
plan into its general corporate reserve account.”262  King expressed concern 
about this transaction.263  In late 1999, Fredericks promoted King and gave 
her certain responsibilities over benefit plan finances.264  After her 
promotion, King learned that the transfer of assets to the reserve fund was 
under consideration once again.265  Concerned that this transaction would 
violate ERISA, King notified Fredericks that she objected to the transaction 
and requested an opinion letter from an in-house attorney.266  In September 
1999, Fredericks restructured the benefits department and again promoted 
King, this time to Vice President of Benefits Resources.267  In early 2000, 
Marriott proposed, and King objected to, another reserve fund transfer.268  
Fredericks fired King shortly thereafter.269
King filed an action in Maryland state court claiming her termination 
violated public policy and was thus actionable under Maryland’s public 
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.
 
270  Marriott removed 
the case to federal court on the ground that section 510 of ERISA 
preempted the state law wrongful discharge claim.271  After it denied 
King’s motion to remand the case to state court, the district court granted 
Marriott summary judgment on all claims.272
The Fourth Circuit, in reviewing the lower court’s denial of King’s 
motion to remand, considered whether section 510 preempted her state law 
 
 
 258. See id. 
 259. 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 260. See id. at 427. 
 261. See id. at 423. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id.  When Fredericks reorganized the benefits fund department, he placed King and 
another employee in charge of the benefits fund department. Id.  King and the other 
employee feuded over the division of responsibilities, and Fredericks claimed that they were 
both terminated over the feud. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 423–24. 
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whistleblower complaint.273  The circuit court analyzed the language of 
section 510 to determine whether it applied to unsolicited internal 
complaints.274  In doing so, the court focused on the meaning of the phrase 
“inquiry or proceeding,” and looked to its interpretation of a similar 
provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).275  The FLSA’s 
whistleblower protection statute prohibits an employer from terminating an 
employee who has “filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be 
instituted any proceeding under or related to [the FLSA], or has testified or 
is about to testify in any such proceeding.”276  In Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q 
Co.,277 the Fourth Circuit held that “proceedings” under the FLSA are 
“procedures conducted in judicial or administrative tribunals.”278  The court 
also held that “the term ‘instituted’ connotes” a level of formality that is not 
reached by making an “oral complaint to [a] supervisor.”279  Thus, the court 
in Ball determined that Congress intended in the FLSA to protect only those 
employees who testify after “formal” proceedings begin, and did not intend 
the FLSA to protect employees who complain internally to their 
supervisors.280
In King, the Fourth Circuit noted that section 510, like the FLSA 
provision, includes the phrase “testified or is about to testify.”
 
281  The court 
concluded that this language suggests that section 510’s reference to 
“inquir[ies] or proceeding[s]” applies to “legal or administrative” 
proceedings, or at the very least, “something more formal than written or 
oral complaints to a supervisor.”282  Relying on this interpretation, the court 
found that section 510 did not protect King because she filed only internal 
complaints with her supervisors, and did not testify or give information in 
what the Fourth Circuit viewed as an “inquiry or proceeding.”283
The court found the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Hashimoto and the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding in Anderson “unpersuasive.”
 
284  The Fourth Circuit 
criticized Hashimoto as driven by policy, rather than any statutory 
analysis.285  The court noted that the language of section 510 is clear and 
thus could not be “fairly construed” to extend to internal complaints, even if 
policy concerns dictated otherwise.286
Because section 510 did not protect King, her state law claim could not 
be re-categorized as a federal claim under ERISA.
 
287
 
 273. See id. at 426–28. 
  As a result, removal 
 274. See id. 
 275. See id. at 427. 
 276. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). 
 277. 228 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 278. Id. at 364. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 427–28. 
 284. Id. at 428; see supra Part II.A (discussing the holdings in Hashimoto and Anderson). 
 285. See King, 337 F.3d at 428 & n.4. 
 286. See id. at 428. 
 287. Id.; see supra Part I.A.5 (discussing ERISA preemption). 
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to federal court was incorrect and the court remanded the case to state court 
for further proceedings.288
C.  The Second Circuit’s Middle Ground 
 
In Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc.,289 the Second Circuit took a middle 
ground regarding section 510’s reach.290  While the court stopped short of 
holding that section 510 protects all internal complaints, the court found 
that section 510 protects internal complaints that are made as part of an 
ongoing “inquiry or proceeding.”291
Plaintiff Chrystina Nicolaou served as a fiduciary and trustee of Horizon 
Media’s 401(k) plan.
 
292  In 1998, shortly after she began work at Horizon, 
Nicolaou discovered a “payroll discrepancy involving underpayment of 
overtime” to certain employees.293  Nicolaou determined that this 
discrepancy was causing an underfunding of the 401(k) plan.294  She 
informed multiple supervisors at Horizon of her concerns, and they told her 
to ignore the problem.295  Nicolaou then contacted Mark Silverman, an 
attorney for Horizon, and asked him to look into the issue.296  After 
performing his own investigation, Silverman confirmed Nicolaou’s 
claims.297  Nicolaou and Silverman then met with William Koenigsberg, 
the President of Horizon Media, and discussed the problem.298  Shortly 
after the meeting, Nicolaou was demoted from her position as Director of 
Human Resources, and was ultimately terminated in November 2000.299
Nicolaou brought an action under section 510 claiming that Horizon 
wrongfully demoted and terminated her.
 
300  The district court dismissed her 
claim, holding that section 510 did not protect her because she was 
participating in an internal inquiry.301  Just as the Fourth Circuit in King 
relied on its prior interpretation of the FLSA,302
 
 288. King, 337 F.3d at 428.  After remand, King argued that her termination was in 
violation of public policy and should thus be protected by Maryland’s public policy 
exception to the at-will employment doctrine. See King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 866 A.2d 895, 
903 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).  The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland rejected this 
argument, finding that King’s discharge did not violate public policy. See id. at 906. 
 the district court relied on 
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the FLSA in Lambert v. Genesee 
 289. 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 290. See id. at 330. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 326. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 326–27. 
 300. Id. at 327. 
 301. Id. 
 302. See supra Part II.B. 
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Hospital,303 where the Second Circuit had held that the FLSA 
whistleblower provision applied only to formal complaints.304
In reviewing the district court’s dismissal, the Second Circuit concluded 
that Lambert was not controlling because section 510’s plain language is 
“unambiguously broader” than the language of its FLSA counterpart.
 
305  
The court noted that while the FLSA extends protection to anyone who “has 
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding 
under or related to” the FLSA, section 510 applies to “any inquiry or 
proceeding” related to ERISA.306  While a “proceeding” refers to the 
“progression of a lawsuit or other business before a court,”307 an “inquiry” 
refers to a “request for information.”308  The court reasoned that Congress 
intended to protect the “informal gathering of information” by extending 
section 510’s protection to “any inquiry.”309
The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether 
Nicolaou was actually taking part in an inquiry or proceeding at the time the 
alleged retaliation occurred.
 
310  The court noted, however, that section 510 
would protect Nicolaou if she could demonstrate that the purpose of her 
meeting with Koenigsberg was to discuss the plan’s underfunding.311
The Second Circuit distinguished its holding from the Fourth Circuit’s 
holding in King.
 
312  Unlike the Fourth Circuit, which held that section 510 
only protects formal, external complaints, the Second Circuit stated that the 
court’s focus should not be on the “formality or informality of the 
circumstances under which an individual gives information,” but rather, on 
whether an inquiry is taking place when the individual gives information.313  
Because Nicolaou’s meeting with Koenigsberg could potentially be 
construed as part of an inquiry, Nicolaou had asserted an actionable claim 
under section 510.314
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rosemary Pooler asserted that the 
majority decision did not extend the protections of section 510 far 
enough.
 
315
 
 303. 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993). 
  Judge Pooler argued that the court should have focused on 
 304. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 328 (citing Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55). 
 305. Id. 
 306. See id. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006), with id. § 1140. 
 307. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (8th ed. 
2004); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1807 (1993)). 
 308. See id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (8th ed. 2004); WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1167 (1993)). 
 309. See id. at 328–29. 
 310. Id. at 330. 
 311. See id.  Although the court on remand determined that Nicolaou was participating in 
an “inquiry” when she was terminated, it still granted summary judgment to Horizon Media 
because Nicolaou could not establish that Horizon terminated her as a result of her 
participation in the inquiry. See Order at 17–20, Nicolaou v. Horizon Media Inc., No. 01 Civ. 
0785 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2008), ECF No. 71. 
 312. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330; see also supra Part II.B (describing the Fourth 
Circuit’s holding in King). 
 313. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330. 
 314. Id. 
 315. See id. at 330 (Pooler, J., concurring). 
2011] PROTECTING THE ERISA WHISTLEBLOWER 263 
Nicolaou’s status as an ERISA fiduciary.316  She reviewed the duties of an 
ERISA fiduciary and argued that fiduciaries should be protected when they 
perform their own investigations.317
Judge Pooler noted that restricting section 510’s protections to formal 
external inquiries would leave fiduciaries few options to deal with potential 
breaches.
 
318  A fiduciary could take no action and potentially face personal 
liability under sections 405 and 409.319  In the alternative, the fiduciary 
could notify a superior and face the prospect of retaliation,320 or the 
fiduciary could inform a regulatory agency and hope that the superiors did 
not find out about this until after the agency began its own inquiry.321  
Lastly, the fiduciary could bring a civil action under section 502(a)(3) to 
enjoin the illegal actions.322  Judge Pooler posited that “ERISA’s framers 
[did not] intend[] to place fiduciaries in such an unenviable position.”323  
Instead, she asserted that it was logical to infer that if a fiduciary has the 
right to sue to prevent ERISA violations, the fiduciary has a right to inform 
the plan administrator of such violations without fear of retaliation.324
Judge Pooler argued that as a fiduciary, Nicolaou should have been 
protected from the moment she began investigating the plan’s funding 
problems, not merely because she met with Koenigsberg.
 
325  Judge Pooler 
asserted that if fiduciaries are not provided with such protection, they might 
be discouraged from vigorously carrying out their duties.326
D.  The Third Circuit:  Section 510 Does Not Protect                          
Unsolicited Internal Complaints 
 
The Third Circuit is the most recent circuit to consider the question of 
whether section 510 extends to internal complaints.  In Edwards v. A.H. 
Cornell & Son, Inc.,327 plaintiff Shirley Edwards claimed that her employer 
terminated her after she complained to management about ERISA 
violations.328  Edwards was the Director of Human Resources at A.H. 
Cornell, as well as a participant in the company’s group health plan.329
 
 316. See id. at 330–31. 
  
Edwards discovered that A.H. Cornell was “administering the group health 
plan on a discriminatory basis, misrepresenting to . . . employees the cost of 
group health coverage in an effort to dissuade employees from opting into 
 317. See id. at 330–32. 
 318. See id. at 331. 
 319. See id.; see also supra Part I.A.3 (describing ERISA fiduciary liability). 
 320. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 331 (Pooler, J., concurring). 
 321. See id. 
 322. See id.; see also supra Part I.A.4 (describing ERISA’s civil enforcement 
framework). 
 323. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 332 (Pooler, J., concurring). 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 (2011). 
 328. Id. at 218. 
 329. Id. 
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benefits, and enrolling non-citizens in its ERISA plans.”330  Edwards 
objected to company management about these practices and was terminated 
shortly thereafter.331  She then brought an action claiming that A.H. Cornell 
violated section 510 of ERISA.332  The district court, relying on the Second 
Circuit’s holding in Nicolaou, dismissed Edwards’ complaint, holding that 
no one requested any information from Edwards and thus she was not 
participating in an “inquiry or proceeding” at the time of her termination.333  
On review, the Third Circuit held that section 510 does not protect 
unsolicited internal complaints.334
The court first analyzed the plain language of section 510 to determine 
the meaning of the word “inquiry” as used in the statute.
 
335  The Secretary 
of Labor argued in its amicus brief that an unsolicited internal complaint to 
management should be considered part of an “inquiry or proceeding” 
because an informal inquiry is often the first step before a more formal 
inquiry is commenced.336  The court rejected the Secretary’s argument, 
noting that Black’s Law Dictionary defines an inquiry as a “request for 
information.”337  Because Edwards’s complaints and objections were 
unsolicited, she was not responding to a request for information.338  The 
court also rejected Edwards’s argument that her objections and complaints 
constituted an “inquiry.”339  The court reasoned that because the statute 
only protects employees who “give[] information” and not employees who 
“receive[] information,” the term “inquiry” only refers to “inquiries made of 
an employee, not inquires made by an employee.”340
The court found the holdings in Hashimoto and Anderson unpersuasive 
because they did not closely examine the statutory language.
 
341  Instead, the 
court agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in King that the statutory 
language limited section 510’s protections to “more formal actions.”342  
The court noted that its prior interpretations of the FLSA should not control 
its interpretation of section 510 because the statutes are “not identical.”343
 
 330. Id. at 219. 
  
The court compared the text of section 510 to that of other anti-retaliation 
statutes and found that not all anti-retaliation statutes are limited to “more 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. at 218. 
 335. See id. at 222–24. 
 336. See id. at 222–23 (citing Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Appellant for Reversal at 16, Edwards, 610 F.3d 217 (No. 09-3198), 2009 WL 
6870704, at *24). 
 337. Id. at 223 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 338. See id. 
 339. See id. 
 340. See id. 
 341. See id.  The court noted that the Fifth Circuit in Anderson only “gave the issue 
cursory treatment,” and the Ninth Circuit focused on a “fair interpretation” rather than the 
statutory text. See id. 
 342. See id.  The court did not address the level of formality required to constitute an 
inquiry. See id. at 223 n.7. 
 343. See id. at 224. 
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formal actions.”344  The court specifically noted that Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision contains broader language than section 510, thus 
demonstrating that Congress explicitly provides broader protection to 
employees in other circumstances.345
Edwards and the Secretary of Labor argued that the court should read 
section 510 broadly because ERISA is a remedial statute.
 
346  The Third 
Circuit rejected this argument.347  Although the court acknowledged that 
ERISA provisions should be “liberally construed” when the statutory text is 
ambiguous, here the plain meaning of section 510 was “unambiguous,” and 
thus the court would not liberally construe the statute.348  The court rejected 
the argument that the failure to protect unsolicited internal complaints 
would undermine section 510, asserting that Congress could have worded 
the statute differently if it was concerned about the lack of protection.349
Judge Robert Cowen dissented from the court’s holding, arguing that 
section 510 protects “unsolicited internal complaints to management.”
 
350  
He disagreed with the majority’s characterization of section 510’s statutory 
language as unambiguous.351  Judge Cowen noted that Congress viewed 
section 510 as essential to ERISA because “‘without it, employers would be 
able to circumvent the provision of promised benefits.’”352  He argued that 
Congress could not have intended to deny protection to employees who 
notify their employer about ERISA violations.353
Judge Cowen criticized the majority for narrowly interpreting the term 
“inquiry.”
 
354  He noted that the court at times seemed to adopt the holding 
from King that only external complaints are protected, and at other times 
seemed to adopt the holding from Nicolaou that section 510 protects 
employees only after an internal investigation commences.355  Judge 
Cowen specifically criticized the Second Circuit’s holding in Nicolaou as 
“unworkable in certain circumstances.”356
 
 344. See id. at 223. 
  He explained that an employee 
could complain to a supervisor about ERISA violations, and the supervisor 
 345. See id.  The court specifically noted that, unlike section 510, Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision provides protection to an employee who “‘oppose[s] any practice made 
an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)). 
 346. See id.; see also Brief of Appellant at 9–10, Edwards, 610 F.3d 217 (No. 09-3198), 
2009 WL 6870703, at *9–10; Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 336, at 16; cf. 
Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 155 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Kross v. W. 
Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1242–43 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 347. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223. 
 348. See id. at 223–24; cf. Wolk v. UNUM Life Ins. of Am., 186 F.3d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 349. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224. 
 350. Id. at 226 (Cowen, J., dissenting). 
 351. Id. 
 352. See id. at 226–27 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 
(1990)). 
 353. See id. at 227. 
 354. See id. at 227–28. 
 355. See id. at 227. 
 356. Id. 
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could respond by asking the employee follow up questions.357  Judge 
Cowen asked whether section 510 protects an employee who responds to 
the supervisor’s follow-up questions.358  He reasoned that if section 510 
does not protect the employee, the supervisor would have an incentive to 
terminate the employee instead of conducting an investigation into the 
allegations.359
Judge Cowen also took issue with the majority’s holding that section 510 
protects only individuals who give information, and not those individuals 
who receive information.
 
360  He argued that the court’s failure to protect 
individuals who conduct inquiries would leave a whole group of employees 
unprotected.361  Employees who conduct investigations into ERISA 
violations need protection more than employees who simply answer 
questions from supervisors.362  Judge Cowen concluded his dissent by 
arguing that analogous Third Circuit precedent interpreting other anti-
retaliation statutes demonstrates that section 510 is ambiguous and thus 
should be given a broad interpretation.363
The extent of section 510’s protections within the Third Circuit is still 
unsettled.  As Judge Cowen noted, certain parts of Edwards seem to adopt 
the Fourth Circuit’s holding in King that only formal external complaints 
are protected, while at other times it appears to agree with the position taken 
by the Second Circuit in Nicolaou.
 
364  Judge Jan E. DuBois of the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently ruled that 
Edwards holds only that section 510 does not protect “unsolicited internal 
complaints,” and that section 510 “unambiguously” protects solicited 
internal complaints.365  Such a ruling appears in conflict with the Fourth 
Circuit’s holding in King that section 510 protects only employees who give 
information in a “legal or administrative” setting.366
III.  SECTION 510 OF ERISA SHOULD PROTECT INTERNAL 
WHISTLEBLOWERS IN CERTAIN INSTANCES 
 
Part III of this Note considers the reach of section 510 of ERISA.  This 
part first considers whether the statutory text is ambiguous and thus whether 
a broad reading of the statute is available.  Next, it analyzes whether policy 
concerns dictate that section 510 protect internal complaints.  It considers 
what steps an ERISA fiduciary must take to obtain protection under section 
510.  It then analyzes the circumstances under which section 510 protects a 
participant or beneficiary.  This part concludes by considering what 
 
 357. See id. at 228. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
 360. See id. 
 361. See id. 
 362. See id. 
 363. See id. at 228–29. 
 364. See id. at 227; see also supra Part II.B–C. 
 365. See Garson v. HVAC Corp., No. 10-1612, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119186, at *8–9 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2010). 
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recourse section 510 provides an individual who is not a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary, and proposes an amendment to ERISA to ensure 
protection for all ERISA whistleblowers. 
A.  Section 510’s Language Is Ambiguous 
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s holding,367 the language of section 510 
is ambiguous.  The Fourth Circuit’s decision in King, that section 510 
protects only formal external complaints, was based on the court’s 
comparison of ERISA and the FLSA.368  But the FLSA whistleblower 
provision protects employees only when they give information in a 
“proceeding,” in contrast to ERISA, which protects employees participating 
in an “inquiry” or a “proceeding.”369  In Nicolaou and Edwards, both the 
Second and Third Circuits determined that their prior interpretations of the 
FLSA statute did not control their interpretation of section 510.370  The 
disagreement between the circuits on section 510’s reach demonstrates the 
ambiguity in the statute’s construction.371  Judge Cowen is correct that the 
wording of the statute is ambiguous and that, because ERISA is a remedial 
statute, section 510 deserves as broad a reading as possible.372
B.  The Necessity of Providing Internal ERISA Whistleblowers                
Broad Protections 
 
Before further considering section 510’s reach, it is necessary to consider 
whether individuals who make either solicited or unsolicited internal 
complaints should be protected as a matter of public policy.  Some 
commentators and courts have asserted that internal whistleblower 
complaints should not be protected because they do not further “public 
policy.”373  But protecting internal complaints about ERISA violations does 
advance public policy goals.  First, by passing ERISA, Congress 
specifically determined that protecting private benefit funds is an area of 
federal concern.374  Defined benefit pension fund finances are also a public 
concern.  If a violation is publicly disclosed, the employer may suffer 
public relations damage.375  The damage from the disclosure could 
financially harm the company,376 which could compromise the employer’s 
ability to fulfill its obligations to the pension fund.  The PBGC may be 
required to take control of the fund if it fails.377  Given concerns about the 
PBGC’s finances in recent years,378
 
 367. See supra Part II.B. 
 it is in the public’s interest that 
 368. See supra Part II.B. 
 369. See supra Part II.B. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006), with id. § 1140. 
 370. See supra Part II.C–D. 
 371. See supra Part II. 
 372. See supra notes 350–63 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text. 
 374. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 375. See supra notes 156–58 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra notes 155–59 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text. 
 378. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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companies deal with complaints internally rather than in public where they 
could adversely affect the company.379  A public disclosure might also 
affect the company’s stock price.380  A drop in stock price may harm the 
company’s shareholders, which may include employees who own company 
stock through employee stock ownership plans.381
Most importantly, because whistleblowers prefer to report internally,
 
382 
they are less likely to report violations if they are required to go outside the 
organization to make the report.  In such cases, it is possible that no one 
will find out about the problem until the situation becomes dire.383  If 
individuals like Chrystina Nicolaou who discover problems with plan 
funding are discouraged from reporting violations, there is a possibility that 
no one will find out about the situation until the plan is unable to fulfill its 
payment obligations.384
Protecting internal disclosures is consistent with ERISA’s goal of 
providing federal regulation of private plans while still maintaining private 
control.
 
385
C.  Who Section 510 Protects 
  Forcing employees to report externally undermines this goal 
because it takes the ability to remedy the situation out of the company’s 
hands. 
1.  A Proposed Standard for ERISA Fiduciaries 
ERISA imposes on fiduciaries an extremely high standard of conduct,386 
and a fiduciary who does not adhere to that standard may be held personally 
liable.387  ERISA fiduciaries who discover ERISA violations have a duty to 
remedy those violations.388
To understand the rationale for broadly interpreting section 510, it is 
important to consider the circumstances under which a fiduciary might find 
it necessary to make an internal complaint.  First, ERISA requires a 
fiduciary who discovers that a co-fiduciary is violating ERISA to take steps 
to remedy the violations.
  Section 510 must protect a fiduciary whenever 
he or she provides information to a supervisor about an ERISA violation.  
Accordingly, section 510 should be read broadly to prohibit an employer 
from terminating a fiduciary for expressing concerns about potential ERISA 
violations. 
389  In some cases, this may require that the 
fiduciary notify a supervisor to remedy the breach.390
 
 379. See supra notes 
  If section 510 does 
156–57 and accompanying text. 
 380. See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text. 
 381. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. 
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 385. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 386. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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not protect this fiduciary, he or she would be forced to risk his or her 
livelihood to remedy the violations.391  Although the fiduciary could bring a 
civil action under section 502(a)(3) to stop the violations,392 this might not 
be the best way to remedy the breach.  For example, a violation may need to 
be dealt with quickly, and the only way for the fiduciary to do that might be 
to notify a supervisor.  Further, a fiduciary who chooses not to report the 
violation to a supervisor out of fear of retaliation may violate the statutory 
duty to act in the exclusive interests of plan participants and 
beneficiaries.393  In that case, the fiduciary could face liability under section 
409.394
A second situation to consider is whether a fiduciary is protected if he or 
she reports to management that a participant or beneficiary has notified the 
fiduciary about an ERISA violation.  In that case, the fiduciary 
responsibility standards seem to require that the fiduciary at least 
investigate the concerns.
 
395
Finally, ERISA requires fiduciaries to disclose information to plan 
participants in certain situations,
 
396 and some courts have extended this 
duty to instances where a company considers plan changes that may affect 
participants’ retirement decisions.397  Because this disclosure is required 
whether or not supervisors at the company want to disclose the 
information,398
Under the Ninth and Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute, section 
510 protects the fiduciary in almost all of the above scenarios.
 it seems logical that ERISA should protect a fiduciary who 
discloses the information against the employer’s wishes.  Similarly, ERISA 
should protect a fiduciary who is attempting to prevent ERISA violations, 
even if this attempt is against the employer’s wishes. 
399  The 
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuit interpretations, however, leave 
fiduciaries unprotected in a variety of instances.400  The Fourth Circuit’s 
holding that section 510 only protects “formal” inquiries in a “legal or 
administrative” setting does not appear to protect a fiduciary in any of the 
situations discussed above.401  The Second Circuit interpretation is 
problematic because it grants protection only when an inquiry is actually 
taking place, and a court may determine that a fiduciary performing his or 
her own investigation is not actually conducting an “inquiry.”402
 
 391. See supra notes 
  The Third 
177–79 and accompanying text. 
 392. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006); supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993); see also supra Part II.A. 
 400. See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. 
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Circuit standard suffers from both of the faults contained in the Second and 
Fourth Circuits’ interpretations.403
Judge Pooler correctly noted in her concurring opinion in Nicolaou that 
ERISA fiduciary responsibility is undermined if no protection is afforded to 
ERISA fiduciaries who express concerns internally.
 
404  Any other reading 
is inconsistent with ERISA fiduciary conduct standards,405 and would 
hamper a fiduciary’s ability to remedy violations.  If employers face no 
consequences for dismissing fiduciaries who express concerns about 
ERISA violations, fiduciaries will hesitate to investigate the violations.  
Such a result will be detrimental to plan participants and beneficiaries, and 
potentially the public, and would be inconsistent with the general goals of 
ERISA.406
2.  Participants and Beneficiaries 
 
The next step is to determine what type of protection a participant or 
beneficiary should be entitled to if terminated for notifying his or her 
employer about potential ERISA violations. 
One of the key goals of ERISA is to protect the benefits of participants 
and beneficiaries.407  ERISA’s protections were specifically designed with 
events such as the Studebaker pension shortfall in mind.408
Unlike fiduciaries, participants and beneficiaries are not engaging in any 
inquiry when going about their daily routines, as they have no statutory 
obligation to correct ERISA violations.
  It is consistent 
with this protective purpose to encourage participants and beneficiaries to 
express concerns they may have about the plan.  They should feel free to do 
so without fear of retaliation. 
409
Section 510 should be interpreted to protect a participant or beneficiary 
who notifies an ERISA fiduciary in writing about an ERISA violation.  
Section 510 expressly protects individuals who “give[] information.”
  Thus, it must be determined 
what conduct by a participant or beneficiary constitutes an “inquiry or 
proceeding.” 
410  
Because a fiduciary has a duty to investigate the alleged misconduct,411 it 
seems logical that providing written notice to a fiduciary should constitute 
the beginning of the inquiry.  Requiring that the complaint be in writing 
will circumvent any later claim that the complaint was never actually 
filed.412
 
 403. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223; supra Part II.D. 
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3.  Individuals who Are Not Participants, Beneficiaries, or Fiduciaries 
Section 510 specifically prohibits an employer from discharging “any 
person” who gives information about an inquiry or proceeding relating to 
ERISA,413 and ERISA defines a “person” as an “individual.”414  
Unfortunately, section 502(a), the enforcement mechanism for section 510, 
does not provide a right of action for an individual who is not a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary.415  Because courts treat the list of plaintiffs in 
section 502(a) as exhaustive, an individual who is a company employee but 
not a participant or beneficiary in the ERISA plan, or a plan fiduciary, has 
no standing to assert a claim under sections 510 and 502(a).416
The individual can look to state law for relief, but that may be 
problematic because of preemption.
  This lack of 
protection applies to external and internal whistleblowers. 
417  A state court may determine that 
ERISA preempts any state law claim on the issue even though ERISA 
provides no remedy.418  Even if ERISA does not preempt a state law claim 
on the issue, the individual may not be able to obtain a remedy because of 
the hodgepodge of state laws protecting whistleblowers.419  Thus, such an 
individual may find protection in one state but not in another.420
There is a strong policy argument that ERISA should protect those 
whistleblowers who cannot bring an action under section 502(a).  These 
whistleblowers may place their careers and livelihoods in jeopardy by 
blowing the whistle on ERISA violations.
  
421  They are only seeking to help 
others, as they have nothing to gain in ensuring that the violations are 
corrected.  They have no rights to benefits like participants and 
beneficiaries,422 and they cannot be held personally liable like 
fiduciaries.423  They are also helping the company by disclosing the 
problems internally as opposed to externally.424
D.  A Legislative Solution to the Conflict 
  Finally, if the protection of 
employee benefits is truly a federal concern, then it follows that federal law 
should provide protection to individuals who seek to remedy ERISA 
violations, whether or not they are participants in the plan. 
Congress should amend ERISA to specifically provide protection to 
internal whistleblowers, and to protect all individuals who report ERISA 
violations.  Such an amendment would have two key components. 
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First, section 510 should be amended to specifically protect internal 
whistleblowers.  This can be accomplished by rewording the language of 
the statute to protect any person who gives information “internally or 
externally” or testifies or is about to testify in any “internal or external” 
inquiry or proceeding relating to ERISA.  Such language clarifies that the 
statute’s protections extend beyond formal external complaints. 
Second, section 502(a) should be amended to provide a cause of action to 
an individual who is not a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, and who is 
terminated for reporting ERISA violations.  Congress should add a new 
subsection to the statute permitting a cause of action “by any person for 
appropriate equitable relief in the case of a violation of” section 510.  This 
amendment would provide a cause of action under ERISA to anyone 
terminated for reporting a violation, regardless of the individual’s status in 
relation to the plan.425
CONCLUSION 
 
It is important that ERISA protect all individuals who report ERISA 
violations.  The extent of protection should not depend on whether the 
report is made internally or externally.  As this Note discussed, protecting 
merely external complaints not only conflicts with ERISA’s aims and goals, 
but is also harmful to the very individuals ERISA is designed to protect.  
Section 510 should protect all individuals who make complaints internally.  
This Note offers a solution to the conflict surrounding section 510’s reach.  
It proposes an interpretation of ERISA that furthers the statute’s aims and 
goals while protecting whistleblowers, and also proposes an amendment to 
ERISA that expands this protection.  This approach will help to ensure the 
protection of important employee benefits. 
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